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Growing	 old	 ‘badly’	 is	 stigmatizing,	 a	 truism	 that	 is	 enrolled	 into	 contemporary	 agendas	 for	 the	
biomedicalization	of	ageing.	Among	the	many	discourses	that	emphasize	ageing	as	the	root	cause	of	
later	 life	 illnesses,	 dementia	 is	 currently	 promoted	 as	 an	 epidemic	 and	 such	 hyperbole	 serves	 to	
legitimate	its	increasing	biomedicalization.	The	new	stigma	however	is	no	longer	contained	to	simply	
having	 dementia,	 it	 is	 failing	 to	 prevent	 it.	 Anti-ageing	 cultures	 of	 consumption,	 alongside	 a	
proliferation	of	cultural	depictions	of	the	ageing-dementia	relation,	seem	to	be	refiguring	dementia	
as	a	future	to	be	worked	on	to	eliminate	it	from	our	everyday	life.		The	paper	unpacks	this	complexity	
for	 how	 the	 ageing-dementia	 relation	 is	 being	 reassembled	 in	 biopolitics	 in	 ways	 that	 enact	 it	 as	
something	 that	 can	 be	 transformed	 and	managed.	 Bringing	 together	 Bauman’s	 (2001)	 theories	 of	
how	cultural	communities	cope	with	the	otherness	of	the	other	with	theories	of	the	rationale	for	the	
making	of	monsters	 -	 such	as	 the	 figure	of	 the	 abject	older	person	with	dementia	 -	 I	 suggest	 that	
those	older	body-persons	that	personify	the	ageing-dementia	relation,	depicted	in	film	and	television	
for	 example,	 are	 ‘the	 Sacra’	 (Turner,	 1967)	 that	 threaten	 the	 modes	 of	 ordering	 underpinning	
contemporary	 lives.	 	 This	 is	 not	 just	 because	 they	 intimate	 loss	 of	 mind,	 or	 because	 they	 are	







for	 incorporating,	assimilating	and	transforming	the	Otherness	that	 the	ageing-dementia	relation	 is	
made	to	 represent.	 	Specifically,	 the	play	upon	the	negative	and	stigmatizing	effects	and	affects	of	
the	 ageing-dementia	 relation	 runs	 alongside	 intense	 media,	 neuro-cultural	 and	 public	 health	
discourses	 that	 emphasize	 how	 ageing,	 and	 specifically	 dementia,	 are	 plastic	 and	 malleable,	 and	
critically,	if	not	preventable,	manageable	and	postponeable.	
	
Public	 health	policy	worldwide	 represents	Alzheimer’s	Disease,	 hereafter	AD,	 as	not	only	wrecking	
individual	 lives,	but	as	a	global	 ‘epidemic’	 that	 threatens	 the	 social	order	 (e.g.	Alzheimer’s	Disease	
International	2013).	Most	recently	it	has	been	claimed	by	the	UK’s	Office	for	National	Statistics	that	
AD	and	dementia	has	become	the	major	cause	of	death	 in	England	and	Wales	(Siddique	2016).	 	As	





degree	 is	 acknowledged	 and	 recognised	 in	 some	 communities,	 we	 still	 have	 much	 to	



















stigmatization,	 including	 processes	 of	 discrimination,	 occurs	when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 fit	 between	 a	
body-person	and	the	worlds	of	others	by	which	they	find	themselves	marginalized.	Inasmuch	as	they	






Incontinence	 and	 bodily	 disintegration	 threaten	 this	 .	 .	 Smell	 and	 disintegration	 undermine	
individualistic	constructions	of	the	person	as	stable,	bounded	and	autonomous.	(Pp.	396-7)	
	
Moreover,	 the	 parade	 of	 ‘monsters’	 (Canguilhem,	 2008)	 or	 ‘revolting	 subjects’	 (Tyler,	 2013)	which	
invoke	‘social	disgust’	(Lawler	2005)	should	not	be	understood	merely	as	responses	to	the	breach	in	
the	social	order	that	older	persons	with	dementia	invoke.	Rather	proliferating	media	representations	
of	 older	 people	 with	 dementia	 are	 created	 spectacles	 of	 ‘othering’	 that	 reaffirm	 the	 values	 and	
modes	of	 ordering	 that	 underpin	 dominant	 forms	of	world-making.	What	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 feelings	 of	
social	 disgust	 and	 the	making	 of	monsters	 is	 the	 very	 production	 and	 reproduction	 of	 values	 and	




thus	 can	 be	 made	 to	 represent	 a	 deviant	 act	 –	 forms	 of	 otherness	 that	 are	 punishable	 by	
stigmatization	and	isolation	(Schmidt,	2011)	–	because	it	contravenes	what	is	most	cherished.		
	
Bauman	 (2001),	 drawing	 upon	 Levi-Strauss,	 suggests	 that	 there	 are	 two	 ways	 of	 coping	 with	 the	
otherness	 of	 others:	 the	 strategies	 known	 as	 the	 emic	 (anthropoemic)	 and	 the	 phagic	
(anthropophagic).		While	phagic	strategies	involve	assimilation	of	some	kind,	the	emic	consists	of:		
	
	.	 .	 	 'vomiting',	 spitting	 out	 the	 others	 seen	 as	 incurably	 strange	 and	 alien:	 barring	 physical	
contact,	 dialogue,	 social	 intercourse	 and	 all	 varieties	 of	 commercium,	 commensality	 or	
connubium.	(Bauman,	2001:	)	
	










a	moral	demand	to	 ‘efface	 the	 face’	 (Bauman,	1990;	Latimer,	1997),	and	which	pivots	around	how	
this	‘other’	is	no	longer	fully	human.		
	
In	 what	 follows,	 I	 show	 how	 the	 creation	 of	 monsters,	 such	 as	 that	 bodied	 forth	 by	 the	 ageing-
dementia	relation,	form	the	background	against	which	dominant	versions	of	what	it	is	to	age	well	are	
being	performed.	 I	go	on	 to	suggest	 that	 there	 is	currently	a	global	 reassembling	of	 the	dementia-
ageing	 relation	 that	 –	 as	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	 normalizes	 the	 stigmatizing	 effects	 and	 affects	 of	
dementia	–	 it	can	also	be	understood	as	a	second	strategy	available	 in	 the	 face	of	breaches	to	the	
social	 order.	What	 Bauman	 calls	 the	 phagic	 (anthropophagic	 strategy)	 aims	 at	 the	 assimilation	 of	
otherness.	So,	rather	than	try	to	exile	the	other,	this	second	strategy	consists	in:		
	





become	 demented	 by	 the	 time	 we	 are	 80,	 emic	 strategies	 alone	 are	 no	 longer	 feasible.	 	 This	 is	
particularly	so	in	the	context	of	a	current	political	climate	designed	to	reduce	rather	than	expand	the	
state	supported	care	sector.		It	is	not	just	that	there	are	not	enough	‘asylums’	to	go	around,	there	are	





of	 illness	 and	 are	 admitted	 to	 acute	 health	 services,	 but	 whose	 troubles	 can	 be	 marked	 as	
inappropriate	for	health	care,	with	their	needs	redefined	as	‘personal’	and/or	‘social’.		That	study	was	
in	the	1990’s.		The	availability	of	care	and	support	in	hospitals,	residential	homes,	or	in	the	home,	is	
even	more	 problematic	 in	 post-welfare	 societies	 (see	 for	 example	 the	 essays	 in	 Ceci	 et	 al,	 2011),	
creating	even	greater	problems	over	who	or	what	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	care	and	 support	of	older	
people,	especially	older	people	with	dementia.		Under	these	conditions,	the	stigma	of	the	dementia-
ageing	relation	 is	being	 intensified,	especially	when	older	people	are	associated	with	care	reduced,	
over	 and	 over	 again,	 to	 its	 economic	 costs	 (see	 figure	 4	 which	 illustrates	 how	 dementia	 is	 being	





endless	 evocation	 to	 age	 well	 instead	 of	 badly.	 Through	 modes	 of	 prevention,	 including	








appears	 to	parade	 the	abject	older	person	with	dementia	as	all	 that	 is	most	 feared	about	growing	
old,	 also	 helps	 reveal	 a	 conundrum	 deep	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 and	
possibilities	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 social	 relations	 through	 which	 to	 reassimilate	 the	 ageing-










































as	at	 the	 same	 time	as	 they	are	making	 the	experience	of	 the	dementia-ageing	 relation	more	and	
more	present	in	everyday	lives	(Carbonelle,	et	al.	2009).	Martin	et	al	(2013)	suggest	that:		
	
	.	 .	 films	 generate	 certain	 feelings	 about	 dementia	which	 then	 become	part	 of	 our	 popular	





character	with	dementia	 are	helping	 to	body	 forth	dementia,	 even	give	 it	 an	existence.	As	Cohen-
Shalev	and	Marcus	(2012)	assert,	these	films	are	often	from	the	perspective	of	those	looking	in	on	a	
person	with	dementia	becoming	other,	a	stranger,	while	others	help	us	to	get	inside	the	experience	
of	 the	 person	 becoming-with	 dementia.	 Swinnen	 and	 Shweda	 (2015)	 suggest	 many	 depictions	
portray	 the	ageing-dementia	 relation	as	 an	 inevitable	process	of	decline	and	unbecoming.	 	 Recent	
examples	 are	 the	UK	 TV	 series’,	Wallander	 (BBC	2016),	 based	on	 the	 Swedish	 TV	 series,	and	 ITV’s	
(2016)	The	Missing,	both	of	which	depict	a	strong,	professional	man	who	occupies	a	senior	position	
gradually	losing	his	memory	and	his	mind,	increasingly	unable	to	work	but	attempting	to	cover	it	up,	
and	 eventually	 becoming	 fragile,	 needy	 and	 dependent.	 	 In	 The	Missing,	 the	 senior	 army	 officer,	
played	by	Roger	Allam,	has	to	be	admitted	to	a	nursing	home,	cared	for	24	hours	a	day.			These	are	
tragic	 depictions,	 the	 decline	 and	 fall	 of	 a	 big	 man,	 and	 the	 gradual	 slide	 towards	 vulnerability,	
fragility	and	becoming	a	non-person.	These	representations	of	dementia	parade	the	dementia-ageing	





particular,	 I	 want	 to	 draw	 on	 one	 such	 intervention	 through	 analysis	 of	 a	 short	 film,	 publically	






emaciated	but	 peaceful.	 	Her	 clothes	 and	 crooked	 teeth	 as	well	 as	 the	paucity	 of	 the	 institutional	
setting	indicate	Gladys	is	not	a	wealthy	woman	–	not	now	at	least.		














with	Alzheimer’s	Disease	 (AD)	nine	years	ago,	and	now	has	 little	 language.	 	 For	many	of	us	 seeing	
Gladys	 like	 this	 represents	 our	worst	 nightmare	 about	 growing	 old	 –	 abandoned,	 institutionalized,	
forced	 to	 endure	 a	 pitiful	 life	 that	 hardly	 appears	 to	 be	 worth	 living	 –	 a	 zombie,	 even	 perhaps	
repulsive	and	disgusting	to	some	viewers.	 In	many	ways	this	 figure	of	Gladys,	co-created	by	us	the	




persons	 becoming	 demented	 depicted	 in	 films	 such	 as	Amour,	 or	 TV	 dramas,	 like	 The	Missing	 or	
Wallander	mentioned	above.		Gladys	seems	‘elsewhere’	to	the	present	reality	of	other	people.	She	is	
perhaps,	more	 or	 less,	 absent	 to	 their	 world-making:	 being	 there	 and	 not	 here,	 as	 Larkin’s	 poem	
expresses	it	in	the	citation	above.	While	this	withdrawal	may	be	due	to	her	disease,	it	may	also	be	her	
retreat,	even	a	refusal,	a	repelling:	a	sign	that	she	no	longer	wants	to	participate	in	the	social.	As	in	
‘The	Old	Fools’	 she	may	be	otherwise	engaged,	 looking	 inward	 to	 the	 fading	 rooms	and	 faces	and	




Shlegel	 in	 Howard’s	 End	 (Forster,	 1910)	 she	 insists	 we	 should	 ‘Only	 Connect!’	 and	 stresses	 that	
Gladys,	like	everyone	else,	needs	and	wants	connection.	While	I’m	not	sure	about	the	discourse	here,	
what	I	want	to	stress	is	how	Naomi	finds	a	way	to	become	competent	in	Gladys’	world	and	connect	
with	Gladys.	What	we	 are	 shown	 is	 Naomi	 reaching	Gladys:	 by	 using	 her	 body,	 and	 her	 voice,	 by	


















extraordinary	 possibility	 is	 created	 which	 has	 the	 chance	 to	 completely	 shift	 how	 we	 know	 and	
understand	Gladys	–	the	supposition	of	her	condition	being	that	of	a	‘living	death’	may	be	not	just	an	
effect	 of	 her	 degenerating	 brain,	 but	 of	 her	 emplacement	 by	 a	world	 that	 does	 not	 know	how	 to	














that	 go	 wrong	 with	 you	 when	 you	 get	 older.	 And	 that	 would	 be	 marvelous	 (Biomedical	
Scientist	of	Ageing	interviewed	in	2010)		
	
Biomedicine	 is	 a	 dominant	 site	 of	 contemporary	 knowledge	 creation	 that	 is	 constructing	 and	
reconstructing	 ageing	 and	 death	 (Vincent,	 2008	 p.331),	 particularly	 dementia	 (Bond,	 1992).	 	 This	
process	 is	 reflected	 in	 worldwide	 programs	 that	 are	 medicalizing	 ageing	 by	 posing	 ageing	 as	 a	
challenge	because	of	links	between	ageing,	chronic	illness,	disability	and	the	increasing	need	for	care	
(United	 Nations,	 2013;	 Vos	 et	 al,	 2008).	 Problems	 that	 get	 highlighted	 include	 the	 prevalence	 of	
multiple	 forms	of	 illness	 associated	with	 later	 life	 (e.g.	Barnet	et	 al,	 2012;	DOH,	2014;	Kings	 Fund,	
2012),	 especially,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 indicated,	 AD	 and	 dementia.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 biomedicine	
intensifies	 the	 reorganization	 of	 health	 care	 not	 just	 around	 technological	 intervention	 but,	
increasingly,	around	modes	of	prevention	and	consumption	(Clarke	et	al.,	2010;	see	also	Kaufman	et	
al.,	2006).	This	 is	 important	 to	note	as	an	aspect	of	 the	political	economy	of	dementia,	 referred	to	
above	in	relation	to	‘bedblocking’	and	the	discourse	of	crisis	in	health	and	social	care.		This	crisis	party	
constructed	 around	 an	 idea	 that	 'we	 cannot	 afford	 dementia'	 which	 is	 of	 course	 partly	 what	 is	
stigmatising	about	it.	Within	this	perspective	the	stigma	associated	with	the	dementia-ageing	relation	
is	 not	 just	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 political	 regime,	 it	 is	 helping	 to	 legitimate	 the	 biomedicalization	 of	
ageing,	 in	general,	and	of	dementia,	 in	particular.	 	 In	 the	context	of	 so-called	 ‘greying	populations’	
and	the	associations	between	ageing,	multi-morbidity	and	the	proliferation	of	chronic	and	disabling	
disease	in	later	life,	ageing	has	rapidly	become	not	just	a	policy	‘problem’	to	be	managed	(Balzagette	
et	 al	 2011),	 but,	 as	Binstock	 et	 al	 (2006)	 suggest,	 an	 exemplar	 scientific	 site	 for	 understanding	 ‘all	
8	
enhancement	 technologies’.	 Specifically,	 knowledge	 practices	 and	 governmental	 processes	 that	
position	 life	as	an	object	of	power	 in	contemporary	capitalist	societies	can	be	understood	as	being	




living	 longer	 than	 we	 have	 ever	 done	 -	 but	 how	 and	 when	 will	 we	 age.	 	 Globalization,	
individualization,	 labour	 market	 de-regulation	 and	 re-structuration	 of	 public	 services	 (Beck,	 2000;	
Higgs	and	 Jones,	2009;	Kohli,	2007)	alongside	 increased	 longevity	have	worked	 to	produce	what	 is	
sometimes	labelled	a	de-standardized	life	course	(Bruckner	and	Mayer,	2005),	including	imaginaries	
of	 more	 fluid,	 post-modern	 life	 trajectories	 (Hockey	 and	 James	 2002;	 Turner	 2009)	 that	 extend	
‘middle	age’	well	into	latter	life.		This	fluidity	is	reflected	in	increasing	emphases	in	health	and	social	
policy	 on	 finding	 ways	 to	 prolong	 productivity	 and	 employability	 (e.g.	 Department	 of	 Work	 and	
Pensions	 2005)	 especially	 a	 ‘third	 age’	 (Lazlett	 1989)	 of	 activity,	 youthfulness	 and	 health	
(Featherstone	&	Hepworth	1993),	with	baby-boomer	hopes	and	aspirations	 for	 ‘timelessness’	 (Katz	
2005),	 and	 an	 endless	 life	 of	 consumption	 and	 choice	 (Turner	 2009).	 How	 people	 age	 is	 thus	 no	
longer	being	seen	as	the	‘natural	and	inevitable	occurrence	of	growing	old’	(Butler	2001–2002,	p.	64),	
but	 as	 something	 that	 is	 plastic	 and	 malleable	 (Moreira	 and	 Palladino	 2008)	 and	 available	 to	
enhancement	(Binstock	2003,	Binstock	et	al	2006).		
	
These	 biomedical	 and	 public	 health	 discourses	 are,	 however,	 simultaneously	 circulating	 dominant	
versions	 of	 ‘successful’	 ageing,	 which	 are	 underpinned	 by	 specific	 notions	 of	 value	 –	 keeping	
productive,	 independent,	 fit	 and	 healthy,	 including	 managing	 risk.	 Rowe	 and	 Kahn	 (1997),	 for	
example,	state	that	the	concept	‘successful	ageing’	has	its	roots	in	the	1950s,	was	popularized	in	the	
1980s,	with	‘success’	classified	in	terms	of	three	features:	low	probability	of	disease	or	disability;	high	
cognitive	and	physical	 functional	capacity;	and	active	engagement	with	 life.	While	the	 life	course	 is	
being	 reimagined	 as	more	 and	more	 fluid,	 possibilities	 for	 successful	 ageing	 are	 increasingly	 being	
individualized	and	 reconstructed	as	a	problem	of	 self-care	and	self-management	of	 risk	 (Hepworth	
1995;	Neilson	2008)	on	the	one	hand,	and	as	available	to	techno-scientific	manipulation	on	the	other	







of	 ‘public	 secrets’	 (Taussig	 1999).	 	 Not	 only	 must	 everyone	 age	 and	 die	 (eventually)	 but	 opening	
ageing	up	as	a	site	of	enhancement	creates	opportunities	for	the	enactment	of	what	is	most	valued	
and	precious	 in	neoliberal	 forms	of	modernity	–	 to	have	a	 ‘future’	and	be	 ‘ready	and	available’	 for	
whenever	the	call	to	do	this	or	that	comes	along	(Latimer	&	Munro	2015).		The	call	here	is	to	manage	




and	 involve	 enactment	 of	 active	 engagement	 in	 managing	 ageing.	 Hepworth	 and	 Featherstone	
(1993)	 in	 their	 ground	 breaking	 work	 on	 representations	 of	 ageing,	 written	 at	 the	 advent	 of	 the	
current	 form	of	capitalism	we	are	experiencing	today,	helped	to	 illuminate	this	shift	 in	possibilities	
around	what	 it	 is	 to	 age	well.	 Through	 an	 examination	of	 ‘Retirement	Magazine’	 they	 analyze	 the	









that	 the	 Third	 Age	 could	 be	 stretched	 indefinitely	 was	 later	 subsumed	 by	 AD.	 	 The	 achievement	
Featherstone	and	Hepworth	depict	involves	individuals	investing	well	in	their	bodies	as	well	as	their	








This	 imaginary	 of	 successful	 ageing	 –	 as	 a	 lifecourse	 managed	 as	 a	 steady	 upward,	 rather	 than	
downward,	curve	–	is	represented	in	public	health	discourse	and	health	promotional	media	as	if	it	is	
available	 to	 everyone.	 Indeed,	 ‘everyone’	 is	 represented	 as	 capable	 of	 achieving	 a	 successful	 and	
prolonged	 third	 age.	 	 Critically,	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 this	 utopian	 project	 is	 represented	 as	 an	 urgent	
issue	 to	 ensure	 sustainable	 futures	 for	 ageing	 societies,	 “a	 future	 that	 takes	 full	 advantage	 of	 the	
powerful	resource	inherent	in	older	populations.”	(WHO	2011).		
	
Just	 think	 for	 a	 moment	 on	 the	 images	 and	 discourses	 in	 the	 media	 that	 endlessly	 promote	 the	
relation	between	active	and	healthy	lifestyles	and	successful	ageing.	We	are	immersed	in	images	that	
characterize	people	 in	middle	 age	 as	 always	doing	 –	 (running,	 rambling,	 going	on	holiday,	 smiling,	
interacting)	–	 they	are	never	static:	as	 if	a	continuously	active,	mobile	present	 is	what	will	keep	us	
youthful	and	postpone	old	age.		This	hopeful	imaginary	is	all	around	and	is	prolific	(Petersen,	2015).		
It	continuously	 incites	people	to	consume	(Hurd-Clark,	2010):	 to	buy	or	 to	 join	–	pension	schemes,	
anti-ageing	 creams	 and	 supplements,	 gyms,	 ramblers’	 clubs,	 bicycles,	 five	 fruits	 and	 veg	 a	 day,	








the	 relationship	 between	 health,	 ageing	 and	 identity	 by	 thrusting	 us	 into	 the	 future	 at	 all	 times,	
putting	us	in	what	Heidegger	(2008)	calls	‘advance’	of	our	bodies	and	ourselves,	so	that	even	a	stroll	
in	 the	 countryside	 to	 a	 favorite	 spot	 becomes	 a	moment	 for	 enhancement,	 heath	 promotion	 and	








‘response-able’	 (Latimer	 1999;	 Latimer	 &	 Munro	 2015)	 persons	 need	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 answer	 the	
incitements	 and	 manage	 their	 ageing	 well,	 with	 what	 counts	 as	 successful	 ageing	 prefigured	 as	
specific	forms	of	personhood	–	active,	productive,	fit.		
	
The	 biopolitics	 of	 ageing	 is	 thus	 being	 reassembled	 in	ways	 that	 not	 only	 cut	 out	 how	 ageing	 is	 a	
relational	co-produced	effect,	but	also	seem	to	represent	a	shift:	from	the	othering	of	the	otherness	
that	 the	 old	 represent,	 to	 a	 phagic	 strategy	 that	 impels	 us	 to	 manage	 our	 ageing,	 ingest	 and	
assimilate	 it,	 and	 so	 change	 its	 very	 character,	 to	 prolong	 being	 and	 seeming	 to	 be	 younger,	













Until	 recently	dementia	has	not	been	of	much	 interest	 to	 clinical	 scientists.	 	 This	 is	partly	because	
dementias	 could	not	be	made	 visible	 as	 located	 in	 lesions	 in	 the	body,	 until	 post-mortem,	 so	 that	
diagnosis	 was	 clinical,	 arrived	 at	 through	 processes	 of	 differentiation	 (Bender,	 2003).	 In	 addition,	








2001),	 mean	 that	 dementia	 is	 becoming	 an	 increasingly	 potent	 site	 for	 both	 clinical	 and	 for	
technoscientific	 research	 (Milne,	 2017).	 Critically,	 we	 are	 witnessing	 how	 dementia	 is	 being	
reconstituted	across	the	biomedical	and	neurological	sciences	as	well	as	mainstream	psychology	to	
grow	 differential	 dementia	 diagnoses	 (Hillman	 and	 Latimer,	 forthcoming).	 The	 medicalizing	 of	





research	 is	 reconstituting	 the	 brain	 as	 much	 more	 plastic	 and	 malleable	 than	 originally	 thought	
(Williams	et	al,	2012),	with	hopes	and	expectations	that	have	gone	public:	
	
…scientists	 worldwide,	 working	 in	 many	 different	 specialities,	 have	 found	 that	 the	 human	







their	 brains	 as	 a	 preventative	 strategy.	 Specifically,	 the	 tragic	 vision	 of	 the	 abject	 demented	 older	
person,	 such	 as	 Gladys,	 legitimates	 the	 enactment	 of	 specific	 values,	 namely	 the	 creation	 and	
capitalization	of	troubles	and	the	triumph	of	endeavor,	including	the	proliferation	of	science,	industry	




Within	 biomedicine	 dementias	 are	 located	 as	 progressive	 or	 degenerative	 diseases	 of	 the	 brain	 in	
ways	that	increasingly	somaticize	mind	and	personhood	(Pickersgill,	2013;	Locke,	2014,	Moser,	2011).	
There	 are	 disputes	 around	 whether	 different	 kinds	 of	 dementia	 are	 the	 natural	 consequence	 of	
biological	decline,	or	whether	they	can	be	reframed	as	a	‘terminal	disease’	or	a	mental	health	issue	
(WHO,	 2015)	 –	 thereby,	 like	 cancer	 before	 it,	mainstreaming	 how	 dementia	 can	 and	 ought	 to	 be	






even	 the	 ageing	 brain,	 can	 be	managed	 –	 reinforce	 a	 phagic	 strategy	 to	 transform	 the	 ageing-
dementia	relation	through	ingestion	and	assimilation.		This	strategy	can	be	seen	in	the	reorganization	
of	 health	 services	 and	 research	 around	 a	 program	 for	 the	 ‘early	 detection	 of	 dementia’	 (Swallow,	
2016),	 and	 the	 constitution	 of	 a	 new	 category	 of	 prepatienthood,	 ‘mild	 cognitive	 impairment’	 (or	
MCI)	 (Katz	 &	 Peters,	 2008;	 Moreira,	 et	 al	 2009).	 It	 also	 includes,	 like	 ageing	 itself,	 a	 notion	 that	
dementia	can	be	modulated,	postponed	or	even	prevented,	provided	 individuals	 live	 the	 right	way	
















Dementia	 is	 frequently	 described	 as	 a	 neuro-degenerative	 disease.	 	 I	 want	 to	 suggest	 that	 in	 the	
contemporary	 moment	 the	 ageing-dementia	 relation	 enacts	 a	 profound	 sense	 of	 immorality.	
Specifically,	 the	dementia-ageing	 relation’s	monstrousness,	 its	 repulsiveness,	 comes	 from	how	 it	 is	
constructed	as	if	it	threatens	what	is	most	sacred	to	Euro-American	notions	of	personhood:	not	just	
the	imaginary	of	the	sovereign	subject,	or	even	one	who	is	merely	reasonable,	but	of	the	subject	who	






personhood	 is	 an	 effect	of	 being	 ‘response-able’:	 and	 as	 I	 have	 suggested	 above,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	












dementia	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 ‘socially	 abject’	 (Tyler	 2013)	 not	 because	 of	 anything	 essential	 or	






spawning	 its	 own	 material	 and	 discursive	 effects	 of	 disaster	 prediction,	 anticipation	 has	




neoliberal	 world-making,	 for	 example,	 through	 self-care	 and	 the	 reflexive	 management	 of	 risk,		
people	as	they	age	can	maintain	their	 ‘status	honour’,	to	use	Weber’s	terminology.	 	But	as	Minkler	
and	 Holstein	 (2008)	 suggest	 this	 then	 acts	 to	 denigrate	 and	 throw	 into	 perspective	 those	 aged	
subjects	that	can	be	made	to	seem	abject.			
	
Following	 Skeggs,	 Tyler	 (2013)	 helps	 us	 to	 see	how	abject	 subjects	 are	 the	 effects	 of	 classificatory	
mechanisms	 through	 which	 specific	 body-persons	 become	 systematically	 defaced	 and	 devalued.		
What	she	goes	on	 to	show	 is	how	the	rubbishing	of	particular	kinds	of	body-persons	 is	because	of	
how	 they	 stand	 against	 particular	 neo-liberal	 institutions	 of	 identity	 and	 personhood,	 not	 least	 in	
terms	of	the	individuation	of	persons	as	discrete,	body	selves	in	ways	that	obscure	how	persons	are	











what	 is	 lost	 is	 even	more	precious	 than	 the	hollowing	out	of	 the	person,	 the	mind,	 the	 individual,	
their	self.		As	Taussig	asserts,	this	despoiling	is	‘attractive	in	its	very	repulsion’,	because	‘it	creates	the	
sacred	 even	 in	 the	 most	 secular	 of	 societies	 and	 circumstances’.	 Specifically,	 at	 moments	 what	
affronts	neo-liberal	world	making	is	the	abject	figure	of	the	old	demented	person	as	one	who	has	not	
managed	their	ageing,	its	repulsiveness	attracts	because	it	helps	recreate	what	is	most	sacred.		The	












The	 inversion	 I	want	 to	propose	requires	us	 to	 ‘dwell	alongside’	 (Latimer	 forthcoming,	and	Latimer	
2013)	dementia.		Dwelling	alongside	is	a	way	of	being	with	and	becoming	with	the	ageing-dementia	







of	 personhood.	 The	 anthropologist	 Clifford	Geertz	 (1973)	may	help	us	 to	 some	extent	 here.	 In	 his	
initial	encounters	with	the	Balinese	the	locals	seem	to	look	at	him	and	his	wife	as	if	it	is	they	‘who	are	
away’;	they	see	through	them	as	though	they	are	naught	but	the	air.	Yes,	at	the	beginning	of	the	film	




The	 opening	 for	 care	 that	 the	 film	 conveys	 thus	 constitutes	what	 Rudge	 (2011)	 calls	 a	 rupture	 of	
certainty.	It	is	not	just	that	there	is	no	way	of	knowing	for	sure	how	Gladys	feels	about	what	is	going	
on.	Of	course,	we	do	not	know	whether	 she	wants	 to	be	 refolded	 into	 the	present,	 ‘awakened’	as	
Saks	(2008)	might	put	it.	Rather,	what	I	want	to	press	is	how	the	deep	ambiguity	at	the	heart	of	the	
ageing-dementia	 relation	 is	 revealed	 –	 for	 a	 moment	 –	 through	 Gladys	 and	 Naomi	 becoming	
differently	 to	how	 they	were	previously	 shown	 to	us.	On	 the	one	hand	 then	can	we	cherish	 those	
with	dementia	as	‘other’	than	us?	And	on	the	other	can	we	begin	to	see,	with	Naomi,	that	the	effects	
of	 dementia	 that	 produce	 the	 figure	 of	 Gladys	 as	 isolated	 and	 disconnected	 are	 not	 so	much	 the	
inevitable	consequences	of	the	decline	and	deficit	caused	by	ageing	and	dementia,	but	perhaps	the	




























The	 phagic	 strategy	 involves	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 dispositif	 (Foucault	 1980),	 an	 actor-network	 of	
associations	for	knowing,	detecting,	managing	and	transforming	dementia:	public	health	discourses	
promoting	healthy	ageing	associate	with	policies	such	as	early	detection	and	diagnosis	of	dementia,	a	
proliferation	 of	 technoscientific	 research,	 media	 representations	 and	 an	 anti-ageing	 culture	 of	
consumption	–	through	which	the	effects	identified	as	dementia	can	be	known,	transformed	or	even	





The	 ‘thinging	 up’	 (Larsen	 2013)	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 as	 something	 available	 to	
enhancement	is	I	am	arguing	occurring	against	a	background	of	the	parade	of	monsters.		Critically,	I	











of	becoming	other.	 	 Perhaps	 the	ambiguity	 and	 conundrum	of	 the	ageing-dementia	 relation	mean	
that	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 figure	 seen	 twice	 (Riles,	 2000):	 the	 figure	 of	 Gladys	 –	 isolated,	 alone	 and	
disconnected	–	‘elsewhere’	as	I	have	put	it	-	can	be	seen	as	an	effect	of	a	disease,	or	as	the	effect	of	
stigma:	 a	 body-world	 relation	where	 becoming	 the	 living	 dead	 of	 dementia	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 how	 a	
person	 is	 stigmatized,	emplaced	and	sequestrated	by	 the	biopolitics	of	 late	modern	capitalism.	 	As	
such	as	Feil	shows	us	we	need	to	find	ways	to	reincorporate	people	like	Gladys.		
	












Thus	 there	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 in	 our	 relation	 to	 Gladys	 as	 we	 first	 see	 her	 it	 is	 us	 who	 are	
elsewhere?		 	By	shifting	our	relations	to	the	characteristics	we	are	being	made	to	see	as	dementia,	
we	can	refigure	them	as	ways	of	being	in	the	world	differently,	and	as	such,	as	other	ways	of	being	
human.	 	Here	 I	 am	 suggesting	we	need	 to	make	 room	 for	 those	 characteristics	 and	ways	of	being	
16	










In	a	phagic	 reversal	of	dementia’s	 fortunes	 the	ageing-dementia	 relation	 is	becoming	 incorporated	
into	 the	 social	 body	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 helping	 to	 reassemble	 the	 social	 in	 order	 to	 transform	 the	
future.	 	 This	 involves	 the	 partial	 biomedicalization	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 alongside	 the	
circulation	of	hopes,	even	expectations,	that	the	otherness	that	marks	the	abject	dementia	subject	as	
‘bad	ageing’	can	be	postponed	and	even	eliminated.	This	includes	being	incited	today	to	be	response-
able	 and	 manage	 ageing	 in	 ways	 that	 keep	 the	 ageing-dementia	 monster	 at	 the	 door.	 The	
reassemblage	 of	 the	 dementia-ageing	 relation	 also	 includes	 opening	 up	 to	 dementia’s	 otherness,	
with	new	 institutions	and	media	 representations	 that	help	us	 trouble	and	even	undo	 specific	neo-
liberal	positionings	to	help	deconstruct	the	ageing-dementia	relation	as	itself	relational,	so	that	there	
are	 possibilities	 for	 finding	 ways	 to	 dwell	 alongside	 dementia,	 give	 it	 room,	 in	 moments	 of	
reworlding.	Here	I	have	in	mind	the	ways	 in	which	dementia	 is	being	partially	transformed	through	
how	 it	 is	 reshaping	 the	 social	 body,	 including	 such	 entities	 as	 dementia	 friendly	 communities,	





social	 and	biomedical	 representations	 and	 interventions	 in	 dementia,	 especially	 those	 that	 dismiss	
the	 biomedicalization	 of	 dementia	 (Lyman	 1989).	 	 Rather	 there	 is	 a	 need	 at	 the	 very	 least	 to	
illuminate	differences	between	when	it	is	a	disease	that	is	making	someone	be	the	ways	that	they	are	
being,	when	it	is	the	lack	of	fit	between	them	and	the	world-making	they	are	emplaced	by	and	when	
it	 is	 them	becoming	differently.	 I	want	to	suggest	then	what	 is	required	by	us	 is	to	dwell	alongside	
those	other	ways	of	being	in	the	world	-	slowness,	immobility,	degeneration,	confusion,	impotency,	
even	 chaos.	 	We	 know	 from	 so	many	 carers	 how	 dementia	 disorders	 the	modes	 of	 ordering	 that	
underpin	our	 living	 together	 in	 the	world,	and	 that	can	 include	our	own	as	 thinkers,	 scientists	and	
researchers.	This	means	finding	ways	to	dwell	alongside	what	we	are	being	made	to	see	as	a	clouding	
of	 the	 light	 of	 the	 enlightenment.	 	 Attempts	 to	 eradicate	 the	 otherness	 of	 the	 ageing-dementia	
relation,	and	dispose	of	dementia	or	at	least	bring	dementia	to	heel,	are	not	necessarily	problematic	
in	 themselves,	 they	 are	 problematic	when	 they	 deny	ways	 to	 challenge	 those	dominant	modes	 of	
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